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Electoral spillovers in an intertwined world: Brexit effects on the 2016 
Spanish vote 
Agelos Delis,1 Konstantinos Matakos,2 Dimitrios Xefteris3 
 
Abstract: The Brexit vote took place three days before the June 26, 2016, Spain’s parliamentary elections, 
in which anti-systemic parties performed worse compared to the previous elections (December 2015) 
despite the optimistic predictions of the pre-election polls and the surge in the support for anti-systemic 
parties that was taking place elsewhere (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). We split the Spanish votes in local ones 
(casted after Brexit) and postal ones (casted before Brexit) and –by employing a differences-in-differences 
model a la Montalvo (2011)— we provide causal evidence suggesting that the electoral performance of the 
anti-systemic parties deteriorated due to the uncertainty and fear of destabilization caused to the Spanish 
electorate by the Brexit vote. 
Keywords: Brexit, Spanish elections, electoral spillovers, natural experiment, uncertainty, anti-systemic 
parties 
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1. Introduction 
On the wake of the Brexit referendum result (Friday, June 24, 2016) IBEX –the main index 
of the Spanish stock market— fell by 12 percent. Until today, this fall is the biggest single-day 
drop in its quarter of a century long history. Hence, it is arguably fair to say that Brexit was both 
not anticipated in Spain and –during those days at least— generated additional fear of 
destabilization and uncertainty in the fragile Spanish party-system and economy. A couple of days 
later (Sunday, June 26, 2016) Spain conducted parliamentary elections for a second time within a 
few months searching a way out of the deadlock (the last election was held in December 2015, but 
no agreement for the formation of a coalition government could be reached). The polls agreed that 
the leftist radical alliance between Podemos and Izquierda Unida was not losing its popularity 
between December 2015 and June 2016, but in the June 2016 election its vote share fell from about 
24.5% to 21.2%.  
Was this unanticipated drop in the electoral support for anti-systemic parties –partially at 
least—a consequence of the unprecedented short-run uncertainty and instability in Spain caused 
by the Brexit vote? Many observers and analysts (e.g. Frayer 2016) have argued that voters 
reasonably reacted to the increasing unpredictability, by refusing to further fuel the fire and gave 
less power to the radical leftist parties. Indeed, a recent strand of literature which includes, but is 
not limited to, Klößner and Sekkel (2014), and Balli et al. (2017) has established that national 
borders are not enough to prevent political instability and uncertainty spillovers: systemic 
uncertainty and instability generated in an interconnected system –such as the EU—  due to an 
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exogenous (or endogenous) incident travel abroad.4 There are many factors that determine the size 
and speed of the spillover, with economic integration between the origin and the destination of the 
contamination being naturally a predominant one. Undoubtedly, the record drop in the IBEX index 
is a striking indication that the uncertainty generated by the Brexit affected Spain both 
economically and politically –as stock market fluctuations also reflect political instability. 
Importantly, while economic anxiety standardly plays a large role in fueling uncertainty, the Brexit 
vote and its consequences might well extend beyond exclusively economic concerns. For example, 
Brexit might have changed Spanish voters’ beliefs about the prospects of a generalized institutional 
crisis (e.g. more countries leaving the EU) or even the likelihood of a Spanish exit should the anti-
systemic parties prevail. In other words, the Brexit vote might have generated fears for multi-
dimensional instability both domestically and at the European level.   
But did Brexit affect the Spanish vote a couple of days later as well? A rational choice 
theory argument would suggest that it presumably did: when faced with an exogenous increase in 
the level of systemic uncertainty and instability (at national and European level), rational voters 
should react by opting for more political stability that systemic parties offer. In a  turbulent Europe, 
shocked by the vote for Brexit, the choice to vote for a systemic party (such as the PP or the PSOE 
in Spain) which is a known variable in the European equation seemed as a more stable option.5 
Despite the apparent reason behind this argument, there is so far no evidence that without the shock 
caused by the Brexit vote, this drop in the electoral support for radical parties in Spain would not 
                                                            
4 Similarly, Böhmelt et al. (2016) establish the existence of policy diffusion from one political system to another. A 
recent discussion (see e.g., Rooduijn 2014) has also ensued on possible diffusion mechanisms of populism across 
European countries.  
5 For a recent discourse regarding the rise of populism in European countries –especially with respect to the issue of 
European integration—one is referred to Hobolt and de Vries (2016). 
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have taken place.6 This short note aims at filling this gap by providing the first piece of causal 
evidence in support of the described link. 
By exploiting, as a natural experiment, the fact that a part of the Spanish population 
residing abroad voted before the Brexit vote while locals voted right after Brexit, we find strong 
indications that Brexit affected the Spanish vote.7 This institutional aspect allows us to conduct a 
differences-in-differences analysis a la Montalvo (2011) and identify the effect on electoral 
behavior of being exposed to the Brexit realization as opposed to voting without it having occurred. 
In what follows, first (section 2), we describe our empirical approach and, then (section 3), we 
discuss our results and their limitations. 
 
2. Data and empirical approach 
We obtain data for electoral results from the Spanish Ministry of Interiors. We use 
information for four General Elections 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2016 and two European Elections 
2009 and 2014. The size and composition of non-resident’s districts considerably changed in 2009 
(up to 2009 the actual CERA vote was on average slightly above 1% of the total vote, while from 
2011 on it ranged about 0.3%).8 Our sample contains data for 18 provinces and we have 
information about the votes of Spanish citizens residing in Spain (Non-CERA votes) and also 
                                                            
6 If anything, popular wisdom would suggest that, as is the case of Donald Trump’s success in the November 2016 
US presidential election, the populists’ success in the Brexit vote might have boosted anti-systemic parties in the 
Spanish elections as well. 
7 Natural experiments are consistently being exploited for the study of a variety of political economy questions. Recent 
examples include, but are not limited to, Giani (2017), Dinas et al. (2017), Giannetti and Grofman (2011), Ferwerda 
(2014), Spenkuch and Toniatti (2015), De Melo and Silveira (2011), Lucardi (2017). 
8 While the actual CERA vote decreased by approximately 60%-70% the eligible CERA voters decreased by more 
than 90%, since after 2009 registered voters had to re-apply for every single election in order to be allowed to vote. 
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about votes from Spanish citizens permanently9 living abroad (CERA votes) for each province. In 
particular, we know how many votes each party got for each one of these two groups of voters for 
all the elections mentioned above. Hence, we can organize our data as a panel with six elections 
and 36 districts (18 Non-CERA and 18 CERA). 
We define as non-systemic parties all the parties that participated in the Unidos Podemos 
coalition for the June 2016 election and left wing, green and nationalist parties from different 
provinces. For example, political parties like Izquierda Unida in all its earlier incarnations and 
Compromís-Q.  The left-wing nationalist parties we include in our definition are for Catalunia; 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya in its all different formats over the years and for the Basque 
Country; Euskal Herria Bildu. Other examples of left wing and green nationalist parties are Europa 
de los Pueblos-Verdes, a coalition of nationalist parties from Catalunia, Basque Country, Aragon, 
Galicia, Balearic Islands and Castilla y León. Table 1 summarizes our definition of non-systemic 
parties as it evolves over time. 
There are other political parties that can be described as non-systemic. But our definition 
attempts to capture: a) parties that appear not to be part of the political establishment and b) 
political parties that had a significant presence in the Spanish political scene, i.e. had elected MPs 
or MEPs. 
 
 
                                                            
9 There is another category of voters that are temporarily abroad (ERTAS; 14,810 votes in total for 2016) and vote by 
post or at Spanish consulates abroad, but their votes are counted together with the domestic postal votes and no 
information is provided about the party that they voted. 
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Table 1: Non-systemic Parties for General and European elections 2008-2016 
 
Election Parties 
General Elections 2008 Izquierda Unida (IU) 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) 
European Elections 2009 La Izquierda (IU-ICV-EUiA-BA) 
Europa de los Pueblos-Verdes (Edp-V) 
General Elections 2011 AMAIUR 
Compromís-Q 
Esquerra Republicana  
La Izquierda Plural (IU-LV) 
European Elections 2014 Podemos 
La Izquierda Plural 
Primavera Europea 
Los Pueblos Deciden (LPD) 
L'Esquerra pel Dret a Decidir (EPDD) 
General Elections 2015 En Comú  
Podemos 
Unidad Popular: Izquierda Unida, Unidad Popular en Común 
Euskal Herria Bildu 
Podemos-En Marea 
Podemos-Compromís 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya - Catalunya Sí (ERC-
CATSI) 
General Elections 2016 En Marea 
En Comú Podem 
Unidos Podemos 
Euskal Herria Bildu 
Compromís-Podemos 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya - Catalunya Sí (ERC-
CATSI) 
 
Our approach tries to identify and estimate whether Brexit caused a change on the voting 
behavior of the Spanish electorate from non-systemic towards systemic parties, because of the 
increased uncertainty. As explained above, we have information about the political parties that 
voters abroad (CERA vote) chose and also for voters in Spain (Non-CERA vote). The voters that 
were permanently residing abroad could vote either by post until the 21st of June or by casting the 
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vote at a ballot in the embassies and consulates of Spain around the world initially for the days 
22nd to 24th of June.10 Our identification strategy attempts to exploit the fact that the vast majority 
of CERA voters did not know about the outcome of the Brexit vote when they casted their votes, 
compared to the voters in Spain who voted after the release of the Brexit result. 
By splitting the Spanish electorate between standard votes cast on Sunday, June 26, 2016, 
(residents’ districts) and votes which were mainly cast days before Brexit (non-residents’ districts), 
we construct a difference-in-differences empirical model a la Montalvo (2011) and we identify the 
causal effect of the Brexit result on the trend of the vote share of the leftist alliance.  
𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 + � 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡(𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑉𝑉𝑠𝑠)2016
𝑡𝑡=2009
+ 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡                                                                          (1)  
𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 takes the value one if the cumulative vote-share of anti-systemic parties in district s in current 
elections (period t) increased compared to the previous elections (period t-1) and the value zero 
other-wise, 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 and 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠 are a time and district dummies respectively, Vs is a dummy that takes the 
value of one if district s is a Non-CERA one (i.e. it is treated) and zero otherwise, Tt is a dummy 
that takes the value of one if the year is t and is zero for all other years, and 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 is the error term. 
 
 
                                                            
10 An extension was granted until the 26th of June by the Spanish Electoral Office due to delays for CERA voters in 
receiving the necessary paperwork that would allow them to cast their votes. This might have “contaminated” our data 
since we did not have initially information whether the CERA votes were casted by post prior to the 21st of June or 
were casted at urns in Spanish consulates potentially after the 24th of June. But finally, we gathered from a sizeable 
sample of Spanish consulates a breakdown of their votes by post and urn. It turned out that 65% of these CERA votes 
were casted by post implying that if some contamination took place it must have been of a very low degree. In any 
case, even if it took place, it makes our main point stronger since it increases the likelihood CERA voters voted against 
anti-systemic parties and hence making our estimates a low bound. 
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3. Results 
The results back the idea that that turbulence caused by Brexit costed Unidos Podemos an 
increase in their vote-share, and a potential key role in government formation. In the first column 
of Table 2, it is evident that there is a negative causal effect of Brexit on the electoral performance 
of anti-systemic parties in the Spanish General Election of 2016 since the coefficient of interest 
(the one that refers to the interaction Non-CERA * 2016) is highly statistically –and electorally–  
significant. Furthermore, by including treatment leads to check for pre-trends (see e.g., Autor 
2003) we can verify that the parallel trends assumption prior to treatment is clearly satisfied, since 
all pre-treatment differences for the control and treated groups are statistically not significant 
(Angrist and Pischke 2009). Notably, this differential effect of residents’ versus non-residents’ 
districts on the trend of anti-systemic electoral performance exists only for the 2016 elections. In 
other words, the required parallel trends hypothesis, that is required for the differences-in-
differences approach, is found to hold, allowing a causal interpretation of the results. 
The reason why we prefer to focus on trends rather than absolute measures of electoral 
performance is because the Spanish political system went through some dramatic institutional and 
party-system structural changes throughout the past years. Despite this, we note that any alternative 
absolute measure yields the same result with respect to the 2016 elections (anti-systemic parties 
performed differentially worse in the resident’s districts compared to non-residents’ districts), 
while, naturally, the placebo tests regarding the previous electoral races are meaningless given that 
anti-systemic vote shares increased from about 5% in 2008 to above 25% in 2015 and, more 
importantly, the composition of non-resident’s districts dramatically changed in 2009 (their size 
was reduced by more than 90%). For instance, in column 2 of Table 2 we substitute our dependent 
variable with the cumulative vote-share of anti-systemic parties and we find exactly this. The 
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Brexit effect is still significant but the interaction referring to the previous election also becomes 
relevant since it captures the political system transformation.11 
Table 2: The Effect of Brexit on Spanish Election 
Dependent Variable Rise of anti-systemic 
vote (Ys,t) 
(1) 
Vote share of anti-
systemic parties 
(2) 
Treatment effect (Non-CERA *2016) 
 
-0.222 -0.116 
 (0.105)** (0.025)*** 
Placebo tests   
Non-CERA * 2015 -0.167 -0.090 
 (0.105) (0.022)*** 
Non-CERA * 2014 0.000 0.038 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Non-CERA * 2011 -0.055 -0.013 
 (0.095) (0.018) 
Non-CERA * 2009 -0.111 0.001 
 (0.107) (0.007) 
Fixed effects YES YES 
R2 0.51 0.93 
N 180 216 
* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses in columns 1 and 2; cluster bootstrapped standard 
errors (20,000 replications) were also constructed, but results remained mostly similar. Treatment lags, 
election year and region fixed effects included in all specifications. 
                                                            
11 The binary variable that we use is free of such concerns and it makes identification of the Brexit effect harder –not 
easier— thus making our point arguably stronger. It requires that there are differences in the trends of the anti-
systemic vote share between the two groups, not just changes in the absolute distances which are very sensitive to 
changes that affect both populations. Indeed, the anti-systemic vote increases on average in both CERA and non-
CERA districts up to 2015 and only in 2016 it exhibits a diverging pattern in terms of trends: it substantially 
decreases in non-CERA districts but less so in CERA ones. 
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Indeed, in such a volatile –institutionally and politically— environment, a rough-cut 
dependent variable like the trend (increase versus decrease) of anti-systemic parties’ electoral 
performance seems as the obvious choice in order to compare political behavior from one election 
to another in a meaningful manner. Of course, the fact that the environment in which this natural 
experiment takes place, went through such important transformations during the recent years, calls 
for extreme caution: a pre-2016 stable institutional and political framework would definitely 
provide additional confidence. But, regardless of the existing limitations and objective obstacles, 
our analysis provides a strong first indication of a causal link between Brexit and the result of the 
Spanish elections, and will hopefully serve as a starting point for subsequent full-fledged studies 
of spillovers among interconnected political entities. 
Our results, beyond supporting popular conjectures made –among others— by the press 
and many academics, also admit a wider interpretation. Past literature has documented the 
existence of substantial policy (e.g., Böhmelt et al. 2016) and institutional (e.g., Gleditsch and 
Ward 2006) spill-over effects. Our work extends these findings by documenting that political 
outcomes and shocks (such as electoral results) of more contemporaneous nature that occur in one 
country can also generate spill-over effects via the channel of systemic instability. It is, therefore, 
fair to say that in our intertwined world attempts to restore last century’s –partial, at most—national 
isolation are at least very difficult to achieve, if not almost impossible. As a result, our findings 
can yield useful insights and suggest possible channels of diffusion to the growing literature that 
studies the rise of anti-systemic parties in Europe and elsewhere (see e.g., Hobolt and de Vries 
2016).  
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